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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
ANIMALS
FENCES .  The defendant had coun-
terclaimed for personal injury damages
resulting from a motorcycle collision with
a heifer on a public highway in an "open
range" area.  The defendant argued on
appeal that Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 24-502 was
unconstitutional in that it limited the
amount of damages and the right of
recovery in a personal injury action.  The
court held the statute constitutional
because no cause of action existed against
livestock owners when the constitution
was adopted.  Carrow Co. v. Lusby,
788 P.2d 1201 (Ariz. App. 1989).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  Prior to the
debtor's filing of bankruptcy, the defendant
vineyard sold to the debtor partially
processed grapes.  Under California law,
Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 55631, a
producer has a lien on any farm product
grown by the producer.  The bankruptcy
trustee attempted to avoid the defendant's
statutory producer lien under Section
545(2) as a good faith purchaser.  The
court held that the producer's lien would be
valid against a bona fide purchaser from
the debtor so long as the debtor had
possession of the farm product.  Because
the debtor had possession of the grapes
upon filing for bankruptcy, the defendant's
lien was valid as against the trustee's
interest in the grapes as a good faith
purchaser.  In re  Loretto Winery,
Ltd., 898 F.2d 715 (9th Cir .
1990) .
Chapter 7 debtors were allowed to
avoid a mortgage against their homestead,
under Section 506(a), to the extent the
mortgage exceeded the value of the
property.  In re  Kostecky, 111 B . R .
823 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
Debtors were not allowed to avoid
judicial liens against their homestead
where the debtors did not have any equity
in the homestead even if the judicial liens
were avoided.  The debtors argued that they
would have equity in the homestead if the
judicial liens were avoided and the property
appreciated in value above the amount of a
mortgage against the property.  The court
rejected this argument because the
determination of the debtors' equity is
made as of the filing of the bankruptcy
case.  In re  Cheek, 111 B.R. 8 2 8
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990).
DISCHARGEABLE DEBT.  Debtor
had signed sham contract to purchase farm
machinery from debtor's son's farm
equipment business in order to allow son
to meet monthly payments to equipment
supplier.  Debtor had personally guaran-
teed the debts of the son's farm equipment
business.  Equipment supplier argued that
the entire debt of the equipment business
was nondischargeable because of the fraud
committed by the sham contract.  The
lower courts held that the debt was
dischargeable because the supplier could
not prove the specific amount of loss
attributable to the sham contract.  The
appellate court held that the debt was
nondischargeable to the extent of the loss
suffered by the supplier and that the
bankruptcy court must make a reasonable
estimation of the loss.  In re  Gerlach,
897 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1990).
EXEMPTIONS.  The Chapter 7
trustee petitioned for rent from the debtors
while they lived in their home during
pendency of the bankruptcy case.  The
debtors claimed their aggregate $15,000
exemption in the homestead which was
valued at more than $15,000.  The court
held that because the homestead became
bankruptcy estate property subject to the
monetary exemption of $15,000, the
debtors were required to pay rent for the
use of estate property.  Matter o f
Szekely, 111 B.R. 681 (N.D. I l l .
1990) .
The Chapter 7 debtor died eight
months after filing bankruptcy case in
which a homestead exemption was
claimed.  The trustee argued that the
homestead reverted back to the bankruptcy
estate because the debtor left no surviving
spouse or dependent child.  The court held
that the homestead did not revert back to
the estate because on the date of
bankruptcy filing the debtor lived in the
residence with a dependent daughter.  In
re  Peterson, 897 F.2d 935 (8th
Cir. 1990).
TURNOVER OF ESTATE
PROPERTY.  Debtors were ordered to
turnover to the bankruptcy trustee all
assets known or unknown by the trustee
where the debtor had attempted to hide
assets through failure to produce financial
documents, false statements, confusion of
goods and concealment.  Evans v .
Robbins, 897 F.2d 966 (8th Cir .
1990) .
  CHAPTER 12  
AUTOMATIC STAY.  A creditor with
a secured lien against the debtor's farm
land was granted relief from the automatic
stay "for cause" because the property could
be sold for more than the lien and could be
custom farmed by the debtor for income
which could be used to finance the debtor's
Chapter 12 plan.  The Bankruptcy Court
had also found that the property was worth
more than the lien and that the creditor
was adequately protected.  Instead of
allowing the creditor to pursue its state
court remedy against the debtor's property,
the lower court ordered the sale of the
property for a minimum amount.  The
District Court reversed the Bankruptcy
Court, holding that the possibility of
selling estate property for more than the
debt secured by it was not sufficient cause
to lift the automatic stay.  In re  Kerns,
111 B.R. 777 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
ELIGIBILITY.  The debtor was a
partnership owned by three sisters who all
had nonfarm jobs and more nonfarm
income than income from the farm
partnership.  The partnership farm was
operated by one of the sister's sons and
two unrelated helpers.  The sister's father
lived in the house on the partnership farm.
The court held that the partnership was a
family farm eligible for Chapter 12.
Matter of LLL Farms, 111 B . R .
1016 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1990).
PLAN.  The debtor's Chapter 12 plan
failed to specifically provide for a pre-
petition priority lien of a bank on the
debtor's farm equipment.  The court held
that the plan was ambiguous in that it
provided that secured creditors would retain
their liens until fully paid under the plan
but the plan erroneously identified the
FmHA as having a priority lien on the
equipment.  The court held that because
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the debtor should have known about the
creditor's prior secured lien on the
equipment and that the ambiguity of the
plan would be resolved against the debtor,
who drafted the plan, the creditor's lien
was not extinguished by confirmation of
the plan which did not specifically
mention the lien.  In re  Duplechain,
111 B.R. 576 (Bankr. W.D. La.
1990) .
PLAN CONFIRMATION.  A Chapter
12 plan provided that the debtors would
retain crop land which had been purchased
from a creditor on contract and payments
on the contract would be made over the 15
years of the plan.  The creditor argued that
the 15 year payment under the plan was
unfair because of the creditor's advanced
age.  The court held that the age of the
creditor did not affect the fairness of the
plan and that the plan was fair because the
creditor received the same value as would
have been received in a Chapter 7
liquidation.  In addition, the creditor could
still sell the creditor's interest in the
property.  The creditor's argument that the
debtor's plan was unfeasible was rejected
by the court because the creditor failed to
provide current evidence that the debtor
was not complying with the plan after 10
months of the plan had passed.
McCracken v. Brown, 111 B . R .
544 (W.D. N.C. 1989).
The debtor partnership borrowed the
purchase price of the partnership farm
from the Georgia Development Authority.
The Chapter 12 plan provided for payment
of this loan and defaults over the length of
the 30-year plan at an interest rate of 10.2
percent, the current yield of U.S. Treasury
bonds plus two percent.  The GDA had
argued that the payments should be
amortized over 30 years but that a balloon
payment should be required after 20 years
because the GDA was prohibited from
making loans longer than 20 years.  The
court confirmed the interest rate of the
plan in the absence of evidence of a more
appropriate rate from the GDA but allowed
the balloon payment requirement because
20 years would provide the partnership
with enough time to secure alternative
financing.  Matter of LLL Farms,
111 B.R. 1016 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1990) .
  CHAPTER 13
PLAN.  Under In re Houghland, 886
F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989), liens against a
homestead may be bifurcated under Section
506(a) into unsecured and secured claims
with the unsecured claim avoidable under
the cram-down provision, section
1325(a)(5), and the bifurcation was not a
modification of the lien prohibited by
section 1322(b)(2).  In the present case,
the debtors argued that the Chapter 13 plan
could provide for payment of the allowed
secured portion of the lien against their
residence over the length of the plan and
that any defaults outstanding on the
mortgage could be allocated to the
unsecured portion of the lien and thus
avoided.  The court disagreed, holding that
once the secured portion of the mortgage
was determined (as of the date of
bankruptcy filing), the mortgage could not
be further modified.  The court also held
that because the cramdown provision
requires the curing of all defaults, the
debtors were required to cure the defaults as
well as make payments on the allowed
secured position of the mortgage.  Because
the interest rate and amount of each
installment payment were to remain the
same but the total amount to be paid was
reduced, the only modification allowed was
a shortening in the maturity date.  In re
Hayes, 111 B.R. 924 (Bankr. D .
Or. 1990).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
ALLOCATION OF PLAN PAY-
MENTS.  The court allowed the debtor's
Chapter 11 plan to allocate federal tax
payments because IRS had not made any
attempts to collect taxes other than filing
a claim in bankruptcy and the best
interests of all parties supported the plan's
allocation.    Kare Kemical, Inc. ,
112 B.R. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
AUTOMATIC STAY.  The IRS was
not prohibited by the automatic stay to
investigate the debtor to determine the
appropriateness of the taxpayer's tax
exempt status.  U.S. V. Universal
Life Church, 90-1 U.S.T.C. ¶
50,230 (E.D. Cal. 1990).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS.  The
debtor made a federal quarterly estimated
tax payment within 90 days before filing
bankruptcy because of a sale of property
which produced significant taxable capital
gain.  The debtor did not elect to treat the
first year of bankruptcy as two taxable
years.  The bankruptcy trustee argued that
the estimated payment was estate property
because the payment was made in
satisfaction of the debtor's personal
income tax liability.  The court rejected
this argument because the bankruptcy
estate consists of only property held by
the debtor at the filing for bankruptcy.
The trustee also argued that the payment
was an avoidable preference under section
547(b).  The court held that because the
IRS did not receive more than it would
have in a Chapter 7 liquidation, the
estimated tax payment was not avoidable.
The court also rejected the IRS argument
that the tax payment was fraudulent,
because the debtor received full credit for
the payment against the debtor's federal
income tax liability resulting from the
capital gains recognized in the sale of the
property.  In re  Weir, 90 -1
U.S.T.C. ¶ 50,229 (Bankr. D .
Kan. 1990).
RESPONSIBLE PERSON.  Debtor
was president and sole shareholder in
corporation which failed to make
payments of withholding taxes.  The
debtor argued that he was unaware of the
failure to make the payments and took
steps to pay the deficiency as soon as he
was aware of it.  The court held that the
debtor was a "responsible person"
although payment of the withholding
taxes was delegated to other employees and
that the failure to make the payments was
wilful in that the debtor continued to make
payment of net wages to employees after
the debtor was notified of the deficiency.
In re  Vaglica, 112 B.R. 1 7
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1990).
TAXABLE YEAR.  The debtor termi-
nated a qualified retirement plan in 1986
prior to filing for bankruptcy and did not
elect to end the taxable year as of the date
of bankruptcy filing.  The debtor argued
that the federal income tax liability created
by the termination of the plan should be
an estate liability because the funds from
the termination were in the bankruptcy
estate.  The court held that because the
debtor had the statutory election to
terminate the taxable year upon filing for
bankruptcy, thus making the tax liability
a claim against the estate, the entire 1986
income tax liability was not an estate
liability.  In re  Gonzalez, 112 B . R .
10 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1989).
CONTRACTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS .  In an
action for breach of implied warranty
resulting from the sale of diseased cattle,
the court held that Arkansas law was
correctly applied to the action by the trial
court where the plaintiffs were residents of
Arkansas, the injuries and damages were
sustained in Arkansas, the action was
brought in Arkansas and some of the cattle
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were delivered by the sellers to Arkansas.
The plaintiffs had traveled to Missouri and
the sales were negotiated and consummated
in Missouri.  Threlkeld v. Worsham,






WORKERS.  Under the Department of
Labor's H-2A program, nonimmigrant
alien agricultural workers may be granted
visas to work in the U.S. if the employers
can demonstrate the need for the workers.
Such employers are required to meet the
"prevailing practices" in the employer's
region as to worker housing, transporta-
tion advance, frequency of payment and
use of farm labor contractors.  The
Department of Labor issued H-2A Pro-
gram Handbook without public notice or
comment and the handbook defined
"prevailing practice" as that used by a
majority of employers and employers
employing a majority of employees in a
similar occupation.  The court held that
this definition of "prevailing practice"
constituted a new substantive rule in that
the "double majority" requirement was not
a restatement of Department of Labor
policy or statute.  Although the court did
not enjoin application of the handbook
definition, the court ordered the department
to institute rulemaking procedures "with
dispatch."  Comite de Apoyo Para
Los Trabajadores v. Dole, 731 F .
Supp. 541 (D. D.C. 1990).
CATTLE.  The APHIS has affirmed
an interim rule classifying Kentucky as a
Class A state under the brucellosis
regulations.  55 Fed. Reg. 19054
(May 8, 1990).
CHILD NUTRITION PRO-
GRAMS .  The Food and Nutrition
Service has announced the annual
adjustments to the income eligibility
guidelines used to determine eligibility for
reduced-priced meals or free milk for July
1, 1990 through June 30, 1991.  55 Fed.
Reg. 18646 (May 3, 1990).
LOAN PROGRAMS.  The FmHA
has issued a proposed rule amending the
eligibility requirements for emergency,
farm operating, farm ownership and soil
and water loans to require that the
applicant--
"Honestly endeavor to carry out the
applicant/borrower's undertakings and
obligations.  This would include, but
is not limited to, providing current
and complete information when
applying for assistance and making
every reasonable effort to meet the
conditions and terms of the proposed
loan."
55 Fed. Reg. 18607 (May 3 ,
1990), amending 7 C.F.R. § §
1941.12, 1943.12, 1 9 4 3 . 6 2 ,
1945.162 .
MEAT AND MILK PROD-
UCTS .  The APHIS has issued a
proposed rule which would allow the
importation of meat and milk products of
ruminants and swine from countries free of
rinderpest and foot and mouth disease
through a country not free of those
diseases if the products are kept in sealed
containers, instead of requiring the sealing
of an entire hold or compartment of the
carrier.  The proposed rules also allow
importation of such products in some
cases where the seals on the containers
have been broken.  55 Fed. R e g .
18342 (May 2, 1990), amending 9
C.F.R. Part 94.
MILK.  The AMS has announced the
suspension in the Great Basin milk
marketing order of the requirement that a
producer who was not a producer under the
Great Basin order in a previous month
would not be eligible to have milk
diverted to a nonpool plant until after one
day's production was received at a pool
plant.  55 Fed. Reg. 18303 (May 2 ,
1990) .
NATIONAL FORESTS .  Several
environmental groups sought review of a
comprehensive land resource management
plan for the Rio Grande National Forest.
The court held that the plan was deficient
(1) for failure to identify the technology
which would prevent irreversible damage
to soil resources, (2) for failure to
adequately explain economic factors and
provide an economic efficiency analysis,
(3) for failure to adequately consider
alternative plans, and (4) for failure to
identify how the plan complied with the
Clean Water Act.  The court held that the
plan adequately considered the
environmental effects on visual resources
and water quality and that the
environmental impact statement in the
plan was adequate because it provided for
on-going, site specific impact studies.
The plan was not required to consider the
cumulative impacts in the environmental
impact study.  Citizens for
Environmental Quality v. U . S . ,
731 F. Supp. 970 (D. C o l o .
1989) .
A land resource management plan for
the Bighorn National Forest was enjoined
because the plan provided for a seven year
regeneration standard instead of the five-
year regeneration standard required by 11
U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(ii).  Sierra
Club v. Cargill, 732 F. Supp.
1095 (D. Colo. 1990).
SCHOOL BREAKFAST PRO-
GRAM.  The Food and Nutrition Service
has issued a proposed rule requiring state
agencies to (1) provide information to
school boards and public officials
concerning the benefits and availability of
the program and (2) direct special
informational efforts annually toward
selected non-participating schools with a
substantial low-income enrollment.  5 5
Fed. Reg. 18908 (May 7, 1990).
TREES.  The CCC has adopted final
regulations for the 1989 Tree Assistance
Program for losses from earthquakes by
commercial growers of trees for crops or
timber.  55 Fed. Reg. 19053 (May
8, 1990), adding 7 C.F.R. §
1478.17 .
USDA .  The USDA has added the
position of Assistant Under Secretary for
Small Community and Rural Develop-
ment.  55 Fed. Reg. 18097 (May 1 ,
1990) .
VIRUSES, SERUMS AND
TOXINS.  The APHIS has issued a
proposed rule which removes the
exemption allowing biological products
prepared for intrastate distribution or
export to be prepared without a USDA
license.  Except for products for which an
extension of the exemption has been
obtained, all such products must be
prepared under a USDA license after
January 1, 1990.  Products produced before
January 1, 1990, without a license may be
distributed until January 1, 1991.  5 5
Fed. Reg. 18345 (May 2, 1990) ,
amending 9 C.F.R. § 114.2(d).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMERS.  At death, dece-
dent owned U.S. savings bonds, some
jointly with a surviving person and some
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individually, with the proceeds payable to
the surviving person.  IRS ruled that the
survivor's written disclaimer of the interest
in the savings bonds within nine months
of the decedent's death was effective
because the decedent held the power during
life to cash in the bonds without the
survivor's consent.  Ltr. R u l .
9017026, Jan. 26, 1990.
GENERATION SKIPPING
TRANSFERS .  IRS has issued the
following new forms:
706GS(D)   Generation Skipping Transfer
                 Tax Return for Distributions
706GS(D-1) Notification of Distribution
                  from a Generation Skipping
                  Trust
706GS(T)    Generation Skipping Transfer
                  Tax Return for Terminations
Trust distributions and terminations which
occur after September 25, 1985 and before
January 1, 1990, must be reported by
August 15, 1990.  Ann. 90 -54 ,
I.R.B. 1990-16, 21.
GIFTS.  The decedent's transfers of
stock to intermediate donees who accepted
stock with the understanding that stock
would be eventually transferred to
decedent's heirs were held to be gifts from
the decedent to the decedent's heirs.
Heyen v. U.S., 731 F. Supp.
1488 (D. Kan. 1990).
GROSS ESTATE.  Decedent was a
settlor of a revocable trust in which the
decedent was the sole beneficiary and had
the power to direct payment of trust
income and principal.  The decedent had
directed the trustees to transfer trust
property to several donees within three
years before the decedent's death.  IRS
ruled that the transfers were includible in
the decedent's gross estate because the
transfers were a relinquishment of the
decedent's power to revoke the trust as to
those assets transferred.  Ltr. R u l .
9016002, Dec. 29, 1989.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT.
At death, decedent held stock in a
corporation which operated a hotel and was
a partner in a partnership which owned
stock in the corporation and which leased
land to the corporation.  The partnership
only collected rent from the corporation
which performed all management
operations on the leased property.  IRS
ruled that the decedent's interest in the
partnership was not an interest in a closely
held business because the partnership was
not an active enterprise producing business
income for purposes of installment
payment of federal estate tax.  Ltr. R u l .
9015009, Jan. 5, 1990.
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  The
decedent's will created a marital trust under
which the trustees
"shall pay to [the surviving spouse]
so much, or all, of the net income of
the said trust as my trustees shall, in
their sole discretion, deem necessary
to provide for her care and support in
the style and manner of living to
which she has been accustomed, and
to provide for her medical or other
emergency needs."
The trust also provided for distribution of
trust corpus for the surviving spouse's
emergency needs and granted the surviving
spouse a testamentary power of appoint-
ment over the trust corpus.  A marital
deduction for the property passing to the
trust was denied because the trust did not
provide for distribution of all of the
income to the surviving spouse nor did it
provide for distributions at least annually.
The court rejected the estate's argument
that extrinsic evidence should have been
examined, because the will language was
unambiguous.  Wisely v. U.S., 90 -1
U.S.T.C. ¶ 60,017 (4th Cir .
1990), aff'g 703 F. Supp. 4 7 4
(W.D. Va. 1988).
The decedent was a recipient of a QTIP
marital trust from a predeceased spouse.
In an amended return, the estate of the
predeceased spouse reduced the value of the
estate's assets, resulting in a decreased
value of the QTIP marital trust and marital
deduction.  IRS ruled that the decreased
amount was includible in the decedent's
estate.  Ltr. Rul. 9017001, Dec .
29, 1989.
RETURNS .  IRS has announced
reminders that in filing Form 706 (1) for
decedents dying after July 12, 1989,
Question 5 in Part 3, Elections by the
Executor, must be answered "No" because
of the repeal of I.R.C. § 2210 and (2) for
decedents dying after December 19, 1989,
line 25 must equal the amount on line 20
of Schedule N and lines 21-24 should be
left blank, because of repeal of I.R.C. §
2057.  Ann. 90-59, I.R.B. 1990-
17, 19.
  TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED
INTERESTS.  The taxpayer transferred
cash and securities to a trust for three years
with the taxpayer to receive the income
from the trust.  The taxpayer was not the
trustee and did not have the power to
change or name successor trustees.  IRS
ruled that the trust was an enterprise for
purposes of I.R.C. § 2036(c) and that the
taxpayer's interest was a qualified trust
income interest not includible in the
taxpayer's gross estate under I.R.C. §
2036(c).  Ltr. Rul. 9016086, Jan.
26, 1990.
TRUSTS .  Two grantors established
an irrevocable trust in which the grantors
and a third party were trustees.  The
beneficiaries of the trust were the three
trustees and several others.  All
distributions from the trust required a
majority vote of the trustees.  Upon the
death of the grantors, the trust terminates
with trust property to be distributed as
appointed by will of one grantor, except
that the grantor may not appoint the
property to the grantor or the grantor's
estate, creditors or estate creditors.  IRS
ruled that the trust was not a grantor trust
with income taxable to the grantors
because distributions could be made only
with the consent of an adverse party and
neither grantor retained more than a five
percent reversionary interest in the trust.
IRS also ruled that the transfer of property
to the trust was not a taxable gift because
the grantors retained dominion and control
over distributions from the trust.  Finally,
IRS ruled that the property transferred to
the trust by each grantor and the
accumulated income attributable to that
property will be includible in each
grantor's respective estates.  Ltr. R u l .




CONTRIBUTIONS.  The taxpayer
was a majority shareholder and chairman
of the board of directors of a corporation.
In order to meet a creditor's demands, the
taxpayer agreed to transfer real property to
the corporation to increase the
corporation's equity.  Although title to the
property was transferred to the corporation
and the corporation's board minutes
authorized the sale of the property, the
property was sold to a buyer who had
agreed to purchase the property before the
property was transferred to the corporation.
IRS ruled that the form of the transaction
had no business purpose, because the
corporation needed the funds from the sale
and the property was not related to the
corporation's business.  Therefore, the
transaction was considered to be a sale of
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the property by the shareholder and a
contribution of the proceeds to the
corporation.  Ltr. Rul. 9016001 ,
Dec. 28, 1989.
DEFINITION.  A corporation reorga-
nized as a business trust with the share-
holders receiving interests in the trust
equal to their interests in the corporation.
IRS ruled that the business trust would be
treated as a corporation for federal income
tax purposes.  Ltr. Rul. 9016033 ,
Jan. 19, 1990.
SALE OF STOCK.  A shareholder of
a corporation proposed to sell all stock to
a son-in-law who was also a trustee of
several trusts established by the
shareholder for the son-in-law's children.
IRS ruled that any loss from the sale of
the stock would be deductible because the
son-in-law was not a lineal descendant of
the shareholder and the son-in-law was
purchasing the stock with personal funds.
Ltr. Rul. 9017008, Jan. 24, 1990.
CAPITALIZATION OF EX-
PENSES .  The taxpayer invested
unexpended funds from a construction loan
during the construction period and
attempted to net the interest income with
the interest expense to reduce the amount
of interest required to be capitalized.  IRS
ruled that for purposes of former I.R.C. §
189 and current I.R.C. § 263A(f), a
taxpayer may not offset interest expense
required to be capitalized under those
sections with interest income generated by
funds acquired through the same loan
which produced the interest expense.
Rev. Rul. 90-40, I.R.B. 1990-18 ,
5 .
CASUALTY LOSSES.  IRS has
announced the areas of Alabama,
California, Georgia, Mississippi and
Washington which have been declared
disaster areas in which taxpayers who
suffer losses from the disasters may elect
treatment under I.R.C. § 165(i).  Ann.
90-62, I.R.B. 1990-18, 12.
S CORPORATIONS
BUILT-IN GAINS.  An S corporation
plans to terminate its I.R.C. § 444
election and change to a calendar taxable
year, resulting in a short taxable year.
IRS ruled that the short taxable year was a
taxable year for purposes of the tax
imposed by I.R.C. § 1374(a).  Ltr. R u l .
9016088, Jan. 26, 1990.
An S corporation's first taxable year
which was less than 12 months was ruled
to be a taxable year for purposes of the tax
imposed by I.R.C. § 1374(c)(1).  Ltr.
Rul. 9017012, Jan. 25, 1990.
ELIGIBILITY.  Several S corporations
proposed to purchase limited partnership
interests in a partnership formed to own
and operate restaurants.  Each corporation
would contribute cash for the partnership
interest received.  IRS ruled that the own-
ership of the partnership interests would
not increase the number of shareholders in
each corporation because the transaction
has a valid business purpose, only cash
will be contributed to the partnership and
each corporation will continue to operate
its own restaurant business.  Ltr. R u l .
9017057, Jan. 30, 1990.
INADVERTENT TERMINATION.  S
corporation stock held in a Uniform Gifts
to Minors Act account was transferred to a
trust with the same beneficiary.  However,
the trust contained an after-born grandchild
provision which under Rev. Rul. 89-45,
1989-1 C.B. 267 would disqualify the
trust as an S trust.  The corporation
redeemed the stock immediately upon
learning of the disqualification.  IRS ruled
the termination as inadvertent.  Ltr.
Rul. 9017019, Jan. 25, 1990; Ltr.
Rul. 9017017, Jan. 25, 1990; Ltr.
Rul. 9017016, Jan. 25, 1990.
STOCK BASIS.  A shareholder was
not allowed to include the value of
corporation loans guaranteed by the
shareholder where the loans were carried on
the corporate books as corporate debt and
the corporation paid all of the debt and
took all of the interest deductions from the
loans.  Russell v. Comm'r, T . C .
Memo. 1990-217.
SALE OF RESIDENCE.  Tax-
payers sold their residence, moved to
another state to teach children of U.S.
military personnel and purchased another
home over two years later.  The court held
that the exception to the two-year
repurchase rule for military personnel did
not apply to taxpayers who provided
services for the military.  Gantner v .
U.S., 90-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 5 0 , 2 2 0
(S.D. Ind. 1990).
TAX LIENS.  The taxpayer pur-
chased a house in his sole name at a time
when IRS had valid liens against the
taxpayer's property.  Later on the same
day, the taxpayer conveyed the house to
himself and his spouse as joint tenants
without receiving any consideration from
the spouse. The court held that the IRS
liens attached to the entire proceeds of the
house when the taxpayer purchased the
house in his name alone.  The spouse did
not acquire an interest in the house
superior to the IRS because the spouse did
not provide any consideration for her joint
interest in the house.  In re  Hamilton
& Son, Inc., 90-1 U.S.T.C. ¶
50,223 (Bankr. D. Me. 1990).
TRUSTS .  Taxpayers were denied
deductions relating to a foreign based trust
which was held to be a sham.  Taxpayers
failed to provide any evidence to
substantiate the validity of the trust or the
deductions claimed.  Sandvall v .
Comm'r, 898 F.2d 455 (5th Cir .
1990) .
MORTGAGES
   REDEMPTION RIGHTS. Debtor
had mortgaged a farm with the Board of
University and School Lands through a
private bank.  After default and foreclo-
sure, the bank sold the sheriff's certificate
of foreclosure sale to the junior lienholder
before the period of redemption expired.
The debtor filed an action for wrongful
deprivation of the privilege to repurchase
the farm.  The court overturned the trial
court's summary judgment for the bank,
holding that sufficient factual issues
remained as to whether the bank properly
considered the debtor's statutory repurchase
rights.  Lang v. Bank of North
Dakota, 453 N.W.2d 118 ( N . D .
1990) .
PARTNERSHIPS
FIDUCIARY DUTY.  Two
brothers operated a milk hauling partner-
ship.  When the partnership terminated,
the partners held a private auction of the
partnership assets which included a milk
hauling contract.  The one partner pur-
chased the partnership assets but the other
partner was personally awarded the milk
hauling contract.  The court held that the
partner who did not purchase the partner-
ship assets violated the fiduciary duty to
the partnership by applying for the milk
hauling contract after selling it to the
other partner.  Monin v. Monin, 7 8 5
S.W.2d 499 (Ky. App. 1990).
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PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
COMBINES.  The plaintiff was
injured when his hand was sucked into the
engine fan while the plaintiff was
repairing the water pump with the engine
running.  In an action in strict liability for
failure to warn, the jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff with fault apportioned 63
percent to the manufacturer and 37 percent
to the plaintiff.  The defendant manufac-
turer argued that evidence of past similar
accidents known to the manufacturer
should not have been admitted because the
other accidents were not similar.  The
court held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in allowing the evidence.
The defendant also argued that it had no
duty to warn because the rotating fan was
an open and obvious danger.  The court
ruled that the obviousness of the suction
caused by the fan was a jury question.
The court also held that the jury instruc-
tion, "a defective product is unreasonably
dangerous if the danger would not be
recognized by an ordinary person in
similar circumstances," was proper.
Sandry v. John Deere Co., 4 5 2
N.W.2d 616 (Iowa App. 1989).
FERTILIZER SPREADER .
Plaintiff's spouse was killed when a fertil-
izer spreader truck backed over him during
a reloading procedure.  The plaintiff
alleged that the spreader was defective in
that it did not have a back-up warning
alarm.  The court held that factual issues
remained as to whether the absence of the
back-up alarm was an open and obvious
danger and as to whether the manufacturer
of the spreader chassis had a duty to install
the back-up alarm.  Ogletree v .
Navistar Intern. Trans. Corp., 390
S.E.2d 61 (Ga. App. 1990).
RETAILERS.  In a wrongful death
action resulting from an accident
involving a combine, the plaintiff sued the
retail seller of the combine in strict
liability.  The court held that the retailer
was not liable for the alleged defect in the
combine, under Idaho Code § 6-1407(1),
because the retailer did not discover the
alleged defect and did not have sufficient
ability to discover the alleged defect.
Hoopes v. Deere & Co., 788 P.2d
201 (Idaho 1990).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
In a wrongful death action resulting from
an accident involving a combine, the
plaintiff filed the action four days before
the statute of limitations ran on the
action.  The defendant named in the
petition was a subsidiary of the
manufacturer and the petition was amended
after the statute of limitation had run on
the action to name the manufacturer as
defendant.  The court held that the
amendment of the manufacturer as defen-
dant did not relate back to the date of the
filing of the action because the manufac-
turer did not receive any notice of the suit
until process was served on the subsidiary
which occurred after the statute of limita-
tions had run.  Hoopes v. Deere &
Co., 788 P.2d 201 (Idaho 1990).
SECURED
TRANSACTIONS
AUCTIONEERS.  Plaintiffs sold
cows to a dairy farm on an installment
contract and retained a security interest in
the cows which allowed the buyers to
"remove" unproductive cows from the herd
but required written permission to sell any
cows covered by the security agreement.
The dairy farm sold the cows through the
defendant auctioneer but failed to obtain
written permission to sell the cows and
failed to remit the proceeds to the
plaintiffs.  The court held that the
authority to "remove" unproductive cows
did not authorize the dairy farm to sell
unproductive cows.  Because the defendant
auctioneer had knowledge of the plaintiff's
security interest, both directly and through
the filing of the security agreement, the
auctioneer was liable for conversion of the
cows under Idaho Code § 28-9-306.
Newgen v. OK Livestock





MILK.  Plaintiff challenged the Pa.
Milk Marketing Board's increase in
wholesale and retail minimum milk prices
for (1) failure to require dealers and retail-
ers to show the need for an increase, (2)
failure to consider the differences in butter-
fat in milk, and (3) failure to consider
evidence of in-store handling costs.  In
rejecting the plaintiff's arguments, the
court held that (1) the PMMB's procedures
adequately considered all factors for the
increase, (2) the PMMB did consider the
variances in butterfat, and (3) the PMMB
did consider in-store handling costs but
properly chose to reject the testimony of
the retailers.  Finucane v .
Commonwealth of Pa. Mi lk
Marketing Bd., 572 A.2d 27 (Pa.
1990) .
PESTICIDES.  Plaintiff challenged
a town ordinance prohibiting nonagricul-
tural use of pesticides without prior town
approval.  The court held that the ordi-
nance was not preempted by the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
because the ordinance does not regulate
packaging or labeling and FIFRA allows
the states to more stringently regulate the
use of pesticides.  The court also held that
the town ordinance was not preempted by
the Maine Pesticide Control Act or the
Pesticide Board Act.  Central Maine
Power Co. v. Town of Lebanon,
571 A.2d 1189 (Me. 1990).
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